Iran appears to have entered an exceptionally sensitive and dangerous phase. The divisions and dualities within the country’s political power structure over how to confront the United States, Israel, and regional developments have become more visible than ever. As far as can be observed, a significant part of the formal power establishment—from the main economic actors and the financial oligarchy to influential political figures within decision-making institutions and those responsible for the negotiations, such as Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Abbas Araghchi, and Masoud Pezeshkian—stands on one side of this equation.
On the other side, there is talk of forces whose exact identities and positions remain unclear. They are said to range from certain commanders and influential figures within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to those who, in their own minds and imaginations, speak of an “absent leader” or a “hidden figure”—a personality who is supposedly destined to assume the leadership of Iran’s future developments.
Some portray this potential leader as someone who could rely on the wave of millions of people mobilized in defense of the country, on street protests, or on demonstrations of social power. Yet the available evidence has so far provided no indication that this hidden figure seeks a revolution based on the power of the street. On the contrary, it appears that his intended path is not fundamentally different from the course the Islamic Republic has followed since the death of its founder—a path that ultimately leads toward some form of compromise, or at the very least, an understanding with the West.
The problem, however, is that even if part of Iran’s ruling establishment is sincerely seeking an understanding, there is no evidence that the United States and Israel are pursuing the same objective. What can be observed in their conduct and policies bears a much closer resemblance to an effort to identify new opportunities to weaken Iran even further. In the most optimistic scenario, the outcome of this process would be nothing other than “progressive devastation”—the same pattern we have witnessed in recent years in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza, whose consequences continue to afflict those lands.
Progressive devastation means that the people become poorer and more exhausted with each passing day, that the country’s economy steadily grows weaker, that vital infrastructure is damaged, that national security faces ever greater challenges, and that the country’s defensive capabilities gradually erode. Under such conditions, the country finds itself neither in a full-scale war nor in a stable peace, but rather in a state of permanent attrition—a condition whose costs are imposed on society more heavily with each passing day.
The continuation of this process could have two principal consequences for Iran. The first is that a society exhausted, helpless, and trapped in economic hardship may gradually withdraw from the sphere of political action, allowing the current that favors compromise—or what it calls an “understanding”—to gain the upper hand. In such a situation, a succession of concessions would begin in the name of preventing a crisis, and every retreat would become the prelude to demands for further concessions. It is unclear how far such a process would advance, where it would stop, or what its ultimate outcome would be.
The second scenario is even more alarming. In this case, the country would enter a phase of widespread instability, the collapse of political order, growing internal conflicts, assassinations, violence, and deepening social divisions. In such an atmosphere, some political or military forces within the ruling establishment might move toward some form of coup or transfer of power—a process whose outcome cannot be guaranteed and from which no one can know what kind of political system would emerge. The greater danger is that this process could lead to further disintegration of the country’s structure and the weakening of national cohesion.
In either case, the outlook facing Iran is deeply troubling. It appears that the current course cannot continue without a serious reassessment of calculations and strategies. The available evidence suggests that the United States and Israel will not abandon their pressure on Iran, and the belief that the passage of time alone can eliminate these threats is less a strategy than a form of dangerous optimism.
Under such circumstances, the most important issue facing Iran appears to be deterrence: deterrence against a war of attrition, deterrence against military aggression, and deterrence against the course being pursued by the United States, Israel, and certain regional actors. If the country is to escape the endless cycle of pressure, erosion, and insecurity, the first question that must be answered is how such deterrence can be established and upon which forces it can rely.
Can the enormous potential of the people be mobilized? Is there still a force within the power structure capable of organizing a new form of deterrence by relying on social support, the country’s defensive capabilities, and its national resources? A deterrence that could, at least for a period of time, protect Iran from devastating attacks and persistent military pressure, while providing the country with an opportunity to breathe and rebuild?
And if no such path exists, then we must honestly ask: What is the path of surrender? How far would surrender continue? Would it mean conceding advantages step by step until reaching a point at which nothing remains to be defended? Or could a middle path be found—a path that, although it may require accepting certain costs and retreats, would preserve the country’s existence, national cohesion, and Iran’s future capacities?
Perhaps the most important question today is how to pass through a major crisis without allowing the country to be dragged into the abyss of collapse. How can conditions be created in which society has the opportunity to recover, the country’s economy can come back to life, its defensive capacity can be rebuilt, and its national resources can once again be organized? How can Iran reach a point at which it can stand on its own feet by relying on the power of its people, its economic strength, and its defensive capabilities, and distance itself from the dangers threatening it on the near horizon?
What is clear is that the country stands at one of the most difficult moments in its contemporary history. Decision-making under such circumstances requires precise, realistic calculations free from emotional impulses. Slogans cannot replace strategy, optimism cannot fill the void left by harsh realities, and major, fate-determining decisions cannot be made on the basis of a power that does not actually exist.
Before anything else, we must know what means and capacities are available to us. We must understand how these capacities can be organized effectively and how they can be used to create the greatest possible degree of deterrence both domestically and across the region. Perhaps the greatest responsibility today is to use this historic opportunity to preserve the country, maintain social cohesion, and prevent the disintegration of the foundations of national life.
For if this is not done, another prospect also stands before us: a future in which endless war, economic erosion, insecurity, social helplessness, and life under the shadow of permanent threats will shape the years ahead. This is a danger that cannot be ignored, and it can be overcome only through a precise understanding of reality and the adoption of a strategy grounded in the national interest.
**Reza Fani Yazdi — July 9, 2026**