The Role of Statements by Trump, Netanyahu, and Pompeo in Escalating Violence and the Securitization of Protests in Iran
In analyzing why violence has escalated in Iran’s streets, it is not sufficient to focus only on domestic dynamics. Part of this dangerous cycle is the product of the war-driven rhetoric and verbal interventions of foreign actors — rhetoric that, although spoken outside the country, produces real consequences on Iran’s streets and on the lives of its people.
Statements such as “we are ready to fire,” “help is on the way,” “Mossad stands with the people of Iran,” or open encouragement of unrest are neither neutral nor cost-free. When such language comes from sitting or former heads of government or security officials of the United States or Israel, it simultaneously creates three dangerous outcomes.
1) Injecting the Illusion of “Imminent Military Support”
When Donald Trump uses threatening language about being “ready to fire” or “help being on the way,” or when American and Israeli officials speak of “standing with the Iranian people” using security or military language, part of society — especially during moments of anger, pressure, and desperation — may fall into the illusion that:
• A foreign force is about to enter the scene;
• The balance of power will soon change through an “external strike”;
• The cost of street participation is lower because “support” is coming.
This illusion, even if it appears hopeful to some, in practice increases risk-taking behavior in the streets and pushes society toward confrontations whose consequences it cannot manage. The result is more direct clashes and higher casualty numbers.
2) A Propaganda and Security Gift to the Repression Apparatus
The same statements that appear “encouraging” to some are the most valuable propaganda gift to the repression apparatus.
When Pompeo openly speaks about “Mossad agents standing alongside the Iranian people in Tehran’s streets” — regardless of whether it is accurate or exaggerated — the security establishment receives exactly the narrative it has spent years trying to construct:
• Protest is not a social demand but a foreign enemy project;
• Protesters are not dissatisfied citizens but “infiltrators” or “foreign tools”;
• Repression is framed not as a crime but as “defending national security.”
In such an environment, state violence becomes “legitimized,” expands, and any remaining limits that might restrain shootings, arrests, or mass killings begin to disappear.
Put simply: external war rhetoric makes the trigger of internal repression lighter.
3) Escalating the Cycle of Violence from Both Sides
These war-oriented narratives do not operate in one direction. They simultaneously:
• Push part of the protest movement toward greater radicalization and violence;
• Reinforce within parts of the state the belief that they are facing a “proxy war.”
The result is a self-reinforcing cycle of violence in which:
Street-level violence — intensified by foreign rhetoric — leads to securitization, which leads to harsher repression, which in turn leads to even greater violence.
In this cycle, political rationality and the possibility of a low-cost transition weaken day by day.
4) Netanyahu’s Open Encouragement: Unintended Alignment with Repression
Netanyahu’s messages encouraging unrest and implying “security alignment” are, in some ways, even more dangerous, because:
• Israel, rightly or wrongly, is widely viewed in regional public opinion as a symbol of war, occupation, and violence;
• Any rhetorical linkage between Iranian protests and the Israeli state quickly erodes the moral legitimacy of the movement;
• Most importantly, it ultimately strengthens the same repression apparatus Netanyahu claims to oppose.
In other words, Netanyahu’s war rhetoric does not help Iranian freedom; it objectively reinforces the Islamic Republic’s security logic.
5) The Moral Responsibility of Political Speech
In politics, words are not just opinions — they are actions.
When foreign political or security officials speak of intervention, firing, operations, or intelligence presence, they must accept responsibility for the real-world consequences:
Are they willing to accept responsibility for the blood spilled after such rhetoric?
Will they be accountable if protests turn into civil war or expanded repression?
The experiences of Libya, Syria, and Iraq suggest the answer is usually no. War rhetoric is spoken, but the people pay the price.
Testing Foreign Policy at the Cost of Our People’s Lives
Neither Trump, nor Netanyahu, nor Pompeo — nor any foreign official — has the right to turn Iran’s streets into a testing ground for their policies through inflammatory rhetoric.
If there is genuine concern for Iranian lives, the language of war must be abandoned.
Opposition to the Islamic Republic is not strengthened by encouraging securitized unrest, vague promises of “military help,” or references to Mossad and special operations.
It is weakened, appropriated, and ultimately paid for with human lives.
Any responsible movement thinking about Iran’s future must therefore draw two clear lines simultaneously:
• A firm line against domestic repression;
• A clear line against foreign war-seeking and interventionism.
Only under these conditions can the possibility of a low-cost transition, preservation of the movement’s moral legitimacy, and prevention of Iran sliding into a Syrian- or Libyan-style scenario remain alive.
Another Growing Concern: Release of ISIS Prisoners in Syria
Another worrying development is the reported release, transfer, or escape risk involving thousands of ISIS detainees from Syrian prisons and their movement toward Iraq and areas near Iran’s borders.
ISIS and Its Role in Potential Iranian Collapse or Civil War Scenarios
Any serious discussion about the risk of Iran becoming “another Syria or Libya” that ignores extremist forces is removing a decisive layer of regional reality.
ISIS is not just a local insurgent group. In Iraq and Syria it functioned as a violence-production machine: borderless, sectarian, ruthless, and often indiscriminate.
In proxy-war regions, extremist groups sometimes become instruments of destabilization — whether through neglect, transfer, controlled release, or exploitation of security vacuums.
Why ISIS Could Commit Extreme Mass Violence if It Entered Iran
A) ISIS as an External Force
External armed groups lack social accountability. They do not fear social consequences, nor do they plan to live among the population afterward. This rootlessness enables extreme violence.
For them, towns and villages are not homes — they are battlefields.
B) Sectarian Ideology
ISIS ideology frames Shia populations as existential enemies.
In such a worldview, killing becomes not a crime but a “religious duty.”
Distinctions between civilians and combatants often collapse.
C) Mercenary-Like Operational Logic
If ISIS becomes active in Iran destabilization scenarios, it would likely operate as a mission-oriented external force. It would not differentiate between:
Opposition supporters
Government supporters
Ordinary civilians
This is where political conflict can turn into indiscriminate mass killing.
Why ISIS Prisoner Transfers Matter
Recent reports noted U.S. transfers of some ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraq (initially about 150, possibly more later), alongside warnings about prison security risks and potential escapes.
This matters because:
Reactivating Networks
ISIS prisoners are nodes in wider networks. Transfers or escapes can reactivate logistical and communication chains.
Turning Iraq into a Risk Hub
Concentration of detainees increases political and security pressure on Iraq and could create conditions for regrouping or renewed operations.
Afghanistan and Cross-Regional Extremist Networks
Extremist networks today operate across Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and regional border zones through smuggling and underground economies.
Civil war conditions create opportunity structures for extremist groups:
Recruitment
Resource acquisition
Ideological legitimacy
Territorial expansion
ISIS as Both Civil War Accelerator and Repression Justification
Even limited ISIS presence could:
- Increase brutality by shifting violence from political to sectarian identity conflict.
- Provide governments justification for unlimited repression under “national security” or “counter-terrorism.”
ISIS thus becomes not just a security threat, but fuel for an endless violence cycle.
Why Iran Could Be Especially Vulnerable
Long borders
Large geography
Deepening social inequality
Large frustrated youth population
High-stakes geopolitical position
Even small extremist cells could destabilize conditions quickly through targeted attacks on civilians or public spaces.
ISIS as Potentially the Most Dangerous External Actor
If Iran entered state collapse or civil war, ISIS-type forces could become among the most dangerous actors: foreign, sectarian, and indiscriminate.
Recent regional developments show this is not conspiracy thinking but a real risk embedded in regional instability.
Reza Fani Yazdi
July 27, 2026