Political Stalemate and Iran’s Future

Political Stalemate and Iran’s Future: Why Moving Beyond Worn-Out Dualities Is Essential

Introduction: Chronic Political Stalemate in Iran’s Power Structure

To understand Iran’s current situation — its crises, external pressures, sanctions, economic problems, and managerial failures — one cannot look at these factors alone. Behind many of these crises lies a deeper issue that has not only remained unresolved over several decades but has gradually become more complex and dangerous: chronic political stalemate within Iran’s power structure.

This stalemate is not merely about disagreement between political factions. Political disagreement exists in all societies and can even be a sign of dynamism. Iran’s problem is that political disagreements, instead of being resolved within accepted mechanisms and legal competition, have turned into a permanent struggle over the country’s fundamental orientations, control of power centers, and the elimination or containment of rivals.

The result has been an obstacle to consensus on fundamental development projects, with enormous energy from society, government, and elites spent on internal conflicts rather than progress. Now that Iran finds itself in one of the most sensitive periods of its contemporary history, continuing this situation is no longer merely a domestic political problem; the political stalemate is directly tied to national security, territorial integrity, independence, and even the survival of Iran as a powerful and unified state.

Therefore, the main question is no longer which faction should defeat the other. The more important question is: Can we move beyond this worn-out duality and form an independent, national force that — without dependence on foreign powers — breaks the existing stalemate and opens the way for genuine public participation in determining the country’s future?

The Historical Roots of the Stalemate: Changing Names, Continuing Conflict

The roots of this stalemate must be sought in the early years after the revolution. From the revolution to the present, Iran’s political forces have faced each other under different names and divisions: the confrontation between the Imam’s line and liberal and national-religious currents; then revolution versus counter-revolution; later left and right; reformist and principlist; and today moderate, conservative, centrist, and hardliner.

The titles have changed, but the core issue has barely changed. Throughout all these periods, a significant part of political competition has been not about better governance but about determining the Islamic Republic’s fundamental orientation and controlling the main sources of power. This has gradually reproduced a “who beats whom” conflict in which each faction imagines that to advance its policies, it must first limit the rival’s power and ultimately remove it from the arena.

As a result, many of the country’s major decisions have been made not based on economic efficiency or long-term national interests but under the influence of the balance of power between factions. This is precisely where natural political disagreement could have been resolved within a democratic system but has not found a solution within the Islamic Republic, thus turning into political stalemate.

The Difference Between Iran’s Bipolarity and Party Competition in Established Systems

It is sometimes said that political bipolarity is not unique to Iran; America is also divided between Democrats and Republicans, and many European countries have intense party competition. This comparison is only valid to a limited extent.

In established political systems, disagreements between parties can be very intense — over taxes, immigration, social services, the environment, and even some aspects of foreign policy — but the basic framework of competition is clear to all sides. The losing side knows it will not be eliminated and can compete again in the next election. To return to power, it does not need to rely on a foreign government or eliminate its rival forever.

In Iran, the problem is deeper. The disagreement is not merely about tax rates or social services; it is about the most fundamental questions: What is Iran’s development model? How should relations with West and East be? How should regional policy be defined? What is the state’s role in the economy? How should the relationship between private capital and political power be regulated? And even how should the scope and manner of public political participation be defined?

In other words, in many established countries, disagreement is mainly about the details of an accepted path; but in Iran, a significant part of the conflict is still about the main path itself.

The Question of “Growth Path” and Iran’s Economic Orientation

One of the clearest manifestations of this disagreement can be seen in economics and foreign relations. Part of the political and economic forces see Iran’s future mainly in a broad return to the Western economy, attracting Western capital, and reconnecting with Western-led financial structures. In contrast, others emphasize developing relations with China, Russia, Asian countries, the Global South, and structures like BRICS.

The debate itself about which economic policy is more beneficial for Iran is entirely legitimate and should be discussed freely. The problem begins when this disagreement goes beyond a debate about economic policy and becomes a matter of political identity and factional interests. If the success of one foreign or economic policy is seen as the defeat of one faction, national interests gradually get lost in internal competition. At this stage, even the success of a national project may be viewed unfavorably by part of the power structure because it strengthens the internal rival’s position. This is one of the most dangerous effects of the current stalemate.

Two Power Blocs and a Society Much Larger Than Both

In recent years, two major power blocs have faced each other in a new form. On one side is a collection of economic and political forces extending from technocrats favoring neoliberal policies to powerful economic networks and financial oligarchy — currents that have gathered around the Construction, Moderation and Development agents, the Rouhani government, and parts of the reformist movement. Part of the reformist movement, in my view, has undergone a deep transformation over these years, gradually becoming a more acceptable political cover for powerful economic and financial networks.

On the other side is a spectrum of principlists, the Stability Front, and more hardline forces, who also have their own economic, political, and administrative networks.

But the great mistake is to imagine that Iranian society is these two poles. Iran is much larger than these two factions. Millions of Iranians see themselves in neither the first nor the second pole. They may be dissatisfied with both but unfortunately lack a powerful political organization. There is no comprehensive party representing them, they do not enjoy vast economic resources and rents, and they have no organized presence in the main power centers. This population may numerically exceed the social base of each of the two major poles, but it is unorganized, lacks a unified political platform, and therefore dissatisfaction without organization cannot by itself produce effective political power.

The Mechanism of Repelling Force: How Both Poles Strengthen Their Opponents

One of the most destructive consequences of this bipolarity is a mechanism that can be called “repelling force.” Both factions imagine that by weakening the rival, they will become stronger. But in practice, both have weakened simultaneously.

Each new round of conflict disappoints part of the population with one of these two currents. Some who once hoped for reform from within conclude that reform is no longer possible. Some who were once attached to principlism or the revolution’s original ideals also distance themselves as a result of corruption, incompetence, or monopolism.

The main question is: where do these waves of dissatisfaction and the loss of social force go? When there is no independent, organized, national third force, some of them move toward the overthrow-oriented opposition. Thus, while the two factions imagine they are fighting each other, they may in fact be producing social force for opponents of the entire political structure. This situation is dangerous even in normal conditions; but in conditions of war and foreign threat, it can be catastrophic.

From Representation Crisis to the Risk of Overthrow

If millions of dissatisfied people feel there is no way to change the existing structure, naturally their dissatisfaction does not disappear; it takes another form. In such conditions, the slogan “anything is better than the status quo” can gradually become attractive.

Historical experience of various countries has shown that precisely at such moments, foreign powers and forces dependent on them can steer genuine public dissatisfaction in a direction completely different from the interests of those same people.

Dissatisfaction with corruption is real and is the people’s right. Dissatisfaction with the incompetence of unworthy rulers is real and deserves no criticism. And of course, protest against discrimination, rents, political restrictions, and economic problems is also real and is the right of the long-suffering people of our country. But the reality of dissatisfaction does not mean that any force seeking to exploit it necessarily acts in the interest of the people or Iran. This distinction is very important.

How Domestic Bipolarity Becomes a National Security Hole

The greater danger begins when this domestic gap attracts the attention of foreign powers. Great powers do not behave according to political ethics; they act according to their own interests. If Washington, Moscow, Beijing, or a European power feels there is a faction inside Iran that can be used to advance its policies, it will naturally try to establish relations with it.

The issue is not the mere existence of foreign relations. Every country and every political force must communicate with the outside world. The danger begins when a domestic faction, to defeat its internal rival, hopes for foreign power support and relies on it. At this point, foreign relations gradually become political dependence.

How Dependence Is Built

No political current usually wakes up one morning and decides to become a tool of a foreign government. This is a gradual process. First, contact is established. Then promises about the future are made: international support, investment, sanctions relief, political acceptance, a role in the future government, or a place in regional arrangements. Then economic and political recommendations are made: if such-and-such economic policy is implemented, more support will be received; if such-and-such regional policy is abandoned, relations will normalize; if it confronts such-and-such faction, the way for its future presence will open.

Gradually, that domestic current may conclude that its political future depends more on the support of a foreign partner than on the trust and votes of the people. From here, a qualitative change occurs. The domestic current may still consider itself independent, but in its political calculations it constantly considers the reaction and support of the foreign power. And precisely at this point, the domestic political gap becomes a national security hole for the country.

Why This Hole Is More Dangerous Today

In normal conditions, a country may tolerate such a gap for years. But in war conditions, calculations are completely different. When a foreign enemy is directly engaged with the country’s defense, political, and economic structure, any domestic gap can potentially become a point of penetration.

In such conditions, the question is no longer just which faction will win the next election or government. The question is whether the political structure has the ability to maintain national cohesion. If a foreign power concludes that by intensifying internal divisions it can achieve goals it cannot achieve through direct war, it will naturally use this possibility. Therefore, ending today’s political stalemate is not just a democratic demand; it is a necessity for our country’s national security.

Why Didn’t a Third Way Form in the Past?

Now we must ask: if the existing duality has been so destructive, why has a third force not been able to break it over several decades? The answer must be sought in several factors.

First, the Islamic Republic’s political structure has not provided sufficient space for the emergence of an independent third force. Elected institutions have never been open enough for a new social current to form a party without dependence on existing power networks, organize freely, enter elections, and — if enjoying public support — take power. Thus the natural path for a third force to emerge from within the system and from below has been very limited.

Second, the existence of powerful personalities at the top or around the power structure. During Ayatollah Khomeini’s era, his personal and political authority was very high. During Ayatollah Khamenei’s era, the leadership played an important regulatory role between factions. Other figures like Hashemi Rafsanjani, although legally not equal to the Leader, enjoyed extensive political influence and power networks. As a result, there was no independent space even within the system for a third power center to emerge.

Third, the distribution of power among the factions themselves. Different parts of government, economy, political institutions, administrative apparatus, and even parts of the military and security structure were divided among different networks. No faction was powerful enough to completely eliminate another, and no third force was free enough to rise between them. The result was the same stalemate.

The Exceptional Current Conditions

But today, the past situation is not exactly repeating itself. War, assassinations, changes in the decision-making structure, and the elimination or weakening of some powerful personalities who previously played a regulatory or deterrent role have disrupted the previous balance. These changes have been very costly and should not be considered desirable. But politics deals with existing reality, and the reality is that the previous power structure has changed.

On the other hand, war has introduced a new factor into the equation: the increased importance of the country’s defense forces. In conditions where the country is under foreign attack, part of society may take a different view of the military. Those who might previously have opposed parts of the military institutions’ political or economic performance can distinguish between those criticisms and the role of the armed forces in defending Iran’s territory. The military’s valiant defense of the country against foreign attack can create a kind of social capital for them. But this social capital can only become a historic opportunity if used correctly.

A Vital Distinction: The Role of the Military or Military Rule?

Here we must speak very clearly. When we speak of the possible role of the military in breaking the stalemate, the intention should not be the formation of a military government. If the result of the current crisis is only that one non-elected structure replaces another non-elected structure, nothing has been solved.

If the military, because of its organizational power and weapons, imagines it has the right to rule the country for an unlimited period, not only has the stalemate not been broken but it may take a more dangerous form. Therefore, the role of the military, if it is to be positive in this transition, must be limited, defined, and transitional.

The armed forces can be the guardians of the country’s security, prevent the collapse of the entire system, prevent foreign intervention, and provide the necessary security for a transition period. But they must not consider themselves the owners of Iran’s political future and act on such an illusion. The military must be the guarantor of the transition, not the owner of its outcome.

Linking Popular Force and Defense Capacity: The Possibility of Forming a Third Force

The exceptional opportunity today lies precisely at this point. On one hand, a large part of society is tired of the existing duality. On the other hand, the traditional power structure has changed. And third, the country’s defense forces have found a different position in social and political equations as a result of the war.

If a link can be created between these three realities, the possibility of forming a third force emerges. This third force should not be merely military; in fact, if it is only military, it will fail. It must be able to encompass large parts of society — professionals, workers, teachers, academics, honest managers, entrepreneurs, intellectuals, independent political forces, and also the healthy and national bodies of both existing factions.

Among reformists, there are those who are not part of the financial oligarchy. Among principlists, there are those who are not associated with corruption, rents, and extremism. In the government apparatus, armed forces, universities, industries, and civil society, there are also millions of Iranians who neither want the status quo to continue nor see Iran’s future in foreign intervention. The third way must be the political home of this collection.

The Goal Should Not Be Eliminating the Two Factions

One of the historical mistakes of Iranian politics has been the logic of elimination. Every new current that has entered power has been tempted to push its rival aside forever. If the third force does the same, it will have no fundamental difference from past forces.

The goal should not be eliminating reformists or principlists. The goal should be breaking their monopoly over the country’s political space. Any force that accepts the rules of peaceful competition, the country’s independence, and the people’s right to determine their own destiny should be able to be present in Iran’s future. The question is not who should be eliminated from politics forever; the question is that no one should own power forever.

The Transition Period: For What and Until When?

If the current conditions truly require a transitional period, its goal and end must be clear from the first day. The greatest danger of transition periods is that their temporariness gradually becomes permanent. A power that says “I have come temporarily to save the country” may say years later “conditions are still not suitable for transferring power.”

Therefore, the success of a transitional force must be measured by a strange criterion: the faster it can make itself unnecessary, the more successful it has been.

The task of the transition period must be clear: preserving territorial integrity and independence; preventing the collapse of the government apparatus; confronting structural corruption and rentier networks; ensuring public security; opening political space; providing the possibility of free activity for parties and political organizations; guaranteeing media freedom within the framework of law; creating conditions for competitive elections; and ultimately returning decision-making about the country’s future structure to the people.

This period should not be designed to build a new ideology or a new ruling class. It must be a bridge from the current political stalemate to future political competition.

Economy: Without Solving the Oligarchy Problem, Politics Won’t Be Freed

But political reform without economic reform is not enough. One of the main roots of today’s crisis is the deep link between wealth and power. When access to political power enables obtaining rents, monopolies, currency, government contracts, privatization, and public resources, political competition is no longer merely competition over ideas; it becomes war over wealth.

In such a structure, it is natural that wealth owners try to preserve political power and political power holders try to preserve economic wealth. Therefore, breaking the political stalemate is impossible without breaking the cycle of power–rent–wealth–power.

Economic transparency, combating monopoly, judicial independence, oversight of public contracts, preventing conflicts of interest, and cutting the link between political position and economic privileges must be an essential part of any transition program. The most important task of the transition period must be dismantling the crony capitalism that has formed in recent decades. Otherwise, even if political figures change, a new oligarchy will be reproduced in another form.

Independent Foreign Policy: Neither West-Oriented Nor East-Oriented

The third force must also have a clear definition of independence. Independence does not mean permanent enmity with the West, just as it does not mean dependence on the East. Iran must be able to have relations simultaneously with China, Russia, Europe, regional countries, BRICS members, and even with America if equal and respectful conditions exist.

The criterion for relations must be the interests of our country, our Iran. No country should be considered an “eternal friend” or “eternal enemy.” The problem begins when one domestic faction ties its future to one global bloc and another to another bloc. This is the disaster we are currently witnessing — Western-oriented circles within the system to the extent that some rightly call it “Western begging.”

In such a situation, global competition enters our country’s internal political structure and the country becomes a playing field for others. A truly independent foreign policy must be able to use the balance of power, not fall victim to it.

Breaking the Stalemate, Without Breaking Iran

All this discussion can perhaps be summarized in one sentence: Iran needs to break the stalemate, not break the country. These two must not be confused.

Not every change is necessarily progress. One can weaken a government and simultaneously destroy the state and the country. One can remove one oligarchy and create another. One can, in the name of freedom, plunge society into civil war. One can, in the name of saving the people, hand the country’s future to a foreign power. And one can, in the name of security, create a permanent military government. None of these is a solution.

The real criterion must be whether the desired change increases independence, territorial integrity, public participation, social justice, economic development, and the possibility of peaceful power rotation.

Iran Needs a New Political Contract

Ultimately, our country’s problem cannot be reduced to a single person, faction, or institution. The fundamental problem is deeper: after several decades, there are still no rules within which all major social forces can compete with each other without seeing their survival in the other’s destruction.

Iran needs a new political contract. A contract based on a few simple but fundamental principles:

• No faction permanently owns the country.
• No military force has a permanent right to rule.
• No economic current should be able to convert its wealth into political power and then accumulate more wealth using political power.
• No political current should rely on Washington, Moscow, Beijing, London, Paris, or any other capital to gain power.
• No Iranian, as long as they respect peaceful competition and Iran’s territorial integrity, should be deprived of the right to participate in determining their country’s future merely because of political opposition.
• And no power should be able to deprive the people of the right to peacefully change the government and the country’s policies.

Historic Opportunity or the Beginning of a Disaster?

Iran’s current conditions are both opportunity and danger. The weakening of previous power structures can create the possibility of change, but a power vacuum is always dangerous.

• If domestic forces cannot find a national solution to this crisis, others will try to impose their solution on our Iran.
• If the two existing factions continue to spend all their energy destroying each other, both will become weaker.
• If the dissatisfied force of society finds no independent political path, part of it will be driven toward overthrow and foreign-dependent forces.
• If the armed forces use the current situation to permanently seize power, a historic opportunity will turn into a new dictatorship.

But if popular forces, the healthy and national parts of the government structure, and the country’s defense forces can reach an understanding around a limited and clear program for passing through the current crisis, perhaps for the first time the possibility of breaking this vicious cycle will be provided.

The Third Force Must Be a Power That Returns Political Power to the People

The goal of the third way should not be building a third faction to continue the same old game. If two poles are to become three and the same power struggle continues, nothing fundamental has happened.

The third power must have a different nature. It must declare from the beginning that its mission is not permanently seizing power but breaking the monopoly of power and the resulting stalemate. It must be able to attract the healthy parts of both factions, pull the enormous dissatisfied force of society out of passivity and dependence on foreign projects, maintain the country’s security, and then provide conditions for genuine political competition to begin.

The military can play an important role in such a process, but the greatness of their historic role will be precisely in not considering political power their own after providing security and breaking the stalemate. The political force must also gain its legitimacy not from foreign support but from society. The economy must be freed from the captivity of rentier networks and corrupt oligarchy. And foreign policy must pass beyond the hostage of currents leaning toward East and West and have only one compass: the national interests of the Iranian people.

We have witnessed many times over the past decades the renaming of factions. The Imam’s line gave way to left and right; left and right became reformist and principlist; reformist and principlist now appear under new names. But changing names has not solved the problem.

Now the question is not changing the names of the players; the question is changing the rules of the game.

We must move from a system in which each faction sees its survival in the other’s defeat to an order in which defeat in political competition does not mean elimination from the country and political power forever. From an economy in which political power produces private wealth to an economy in which wealth cannot buy political power. From a foreign policy that links domestic factions to global powers to a policy that evaluates all global powers from the perspective of Iran’s interests. And most importantly, from a society in which millions of dissatisfied people lack effective political tools to a society in which this dissatisfaction can peacefully transform into organization, party, vote, and political power.

This is the true meaning of breaking the stalemate.

Iran Today Faces Several Choices

• Continuing the status quo and further erosion;
• Foreign-dependent overthrow and the risk of collapse;
• The emergence of a permanent military power and the reproduction of stalemate in another form;
• Or attempting to create a third way, national and independent, that can use the current exceptional conditions to open political space and return decision-making to society.

In my view, the only option that can simultaneously preserve independence, security, territorial integrity, and the possibility of political change is this third way. The third way is neither the continuation of the Islamic Republic in its past form nor destroying the country to end the Islamic Republic. It is neither submission to foreign power nor closing society in the name of security. It is neither permanent military rule nor the continuation of the corrupt, predatory, and destructive financial and political oligarchy.

The third way must be an effort to create conditions in which the Iranian people themselves can decide about Iran’s future. If the military has a role in this historic moment, that role must be protecting this possibility. If political forces have a role, it must be organizing this possibility. And if the people have a role — which is the most important role — it must be transforming from spectators of the power struggle into the true owners of political power.

Perhaps for the first time in several decades, the crisis has become deep enough that breaking the stalemate is truly possible. But this opportunity can also be very short. If not used, the worn-out domestic bipolarity, economic oligarchy, accumulated dissatisfaction, war, and foreign power intervention can join hands and create conditions where the issue is no longer just the future of a political system; it is the future of Iran itself.

Therefore, our choice today should not be between preserving the status quo and destruction. Another choice must be brought to the field:

Change, without collapse. Independence, without isolation. Security, without dictatorship. Public participation, without foreign intervention. And breaking the stalemate, without breaking Iran.

How Can the Third Way Become an Operational Project?

So far, it has been said that continuing the existing bipolarity leads the country to a dead end, and the third way cannot be merely a new name for a third faction. But if we are to speak of the “third way” as a real solution, we must go beyond slogans and say how this way can take shape in practice.

In my view, the third way cannot be realized through a classic military coup, nor through an unorganized uprising whose tomorrow is unclear, nor through foreign intervention, nor through forming a new party that waits in the same closed structure for an unknown opportunity.

The starting point must be the formation of a national understanding for a limited and transitional period. This understanding can form among three major forces: the independent and national parts of society and political forces; managers, experts, and the healthy body of the government apparatus; and that part of the armed and defense forces that considers its duty to be preserving Iran and its territorial integrity, not preserving one political faction’s monopoly on power.

Each of these three forces has something the other two alone lack. Society can create legitimacy but without organization and security guarantees may not be able to manage a critical period. The country’s administrative and expert apparatus has the experience of running government but alone lacks the political legitimacy to create a new order. The armed forces have the power to maintain security and prevent collapse, but military power alone does not create political legitimacy.

The third way becomes possible when these three elements — social legitimacy, the ability to run the country, and the power to maintain security — come together in a shared and temporary framework.

Step One: Agreement on a Few Principles, Not an Ideology

It would be a great mistake if the forces of the third way wanted to agree on all of Iran’s issues before starting. Socialists, nationalists, reformists, moderate principlists, republicans, religious, secular, and other political tendencies are not supposed to agree on all economic, cultural, and social issues. Such agreement is neither possible nor necessary.

What is necessary is agreement on minimums for preserving the country and opening political space: preserving Iran’s territorial integrity, independence from foreign powers, opposition to the country’s disintegration, accepting the people’s right to determine their political future, not using violence to eliminate rivals, accepting power rotation, preserving essential institutions of government and army, confronting organized corruption and rentier oligarchy, and commitment to holding a competitive political process at the end of the transition period.

Disagreement about the economy, social policy, the relationship between state and market, the degree of concentration or decentralization of power, and dozens of other issues should be left to the day after this period and to party competition. The goal of the third way is not to solve all of Iran’s disagreements; its goal is to create a mechanism through which disagreements can henceforth be resolved without war, elimination, and foreign dependence.

Step Two: Forming a National Transition Council, Not a Military Government

If the current crisis creates the possibility of real change in the power structure, the first institution should not be a military council. Instead, a National Transition Council can be formed with a limited and balanced combination of different forces: representatives of independent political currents, the country’s managers and experts, civil society representatives, and parts of the defense and security structure responsible for maintaining stability and security during the transition.

None of these three parts should alone have a majority or absolute power. This point is especially important regarding the armed forces. The military must be present in the transition council because in war conditions the issue of security and defense cannot be ignored; but they must not control the council. The military must be one of the pillars of the transition period, not its ceiling.

Step Three: The End Date of the Transition Period Must Be Clear from the Start

One of the most dangerous sentences in politics is: “Conditions are currently emergency; we will decide about democracy later.” This “later” may never come.

Therefore, if a transitional structure is formed, its life must be limited from the first day — for example, a specific period that can only be extended in extraordinary conditions and through a pre-determined mechanism. More important than the exact number of months is that no individual or institution can alone extend the transition period.

From the beginning, there must be a political calendar: the time for drafting temporary laws, freedom of party activity, creating an independent election mechanism, and holding elections or direct reference to the people’s vote. The people must know where this train is going and when it will reach its destination.

Step Four: Preserve the State, Change the Rules of Power

One of the greatest mistakes in many political transitions worldwide has been confusing “regime” with “state.” To change a political order, the country’s apparatus must not be destroyed.

Ministries, municipalities, hospitals, schools, universities, electricity and water networks, the central bank, the tax authority, the army, police, transportation system, and hundreds of other institutions do not belong to one political faction; they belong to the country.

Therefore, the third way must declare from the beginning: We have not come to destroy the state; we have come to change the rules of running the state. The experiences in which the collapse of the government apparatus plunged society into chaos and paved the way for civil war, foreign intervention, and disintegration must not be repeated. Political change must occur with maximum administrative continuity.

Step Five: Separate Crime from Political Affiliation

If the third way begins with a wave of revenge, its failure has started from the first day. Membership in a political faction, service in a previous government, or holding a different view should not in itself be considered a crime. A distinction must be made between individual criminal responsibility and political affiliation.

Someone who has committed major corruption, murder, torture, espionage, or a specific crime must answer before the judicial system; but thousands of managers, employees, military personnel, reformists, principlists, or members of a political current should not be purged from the country’s structure merely because of political background. Such a purge is both unjust and empties the government of its experts and managers.

The third way must give a clear message to the bodies of both factions: You are not going to be eliminated; your monopoly on power is going to end. This message can reduce a large part of resistance to change.

Step Six: The Armed Forces Must Give a Clear Commitment

If the armed forces are to play a decisive role in this process, the most important guarantee of public trust is declaring the limits of their own role. They must clearly commit that they will not organizationally support any particular party, will not impose a military candidate on society using armed forces facilities, will not expand their rentier economic activity, will not engineer elections, and after stabilizing security conditions will hand over the country’s political administration to elected institutions.

This commitment is not a weakness of the armed forces. On the contrary, it can be their greatest historical asset. A military that defends the country at the moment of danger and refrains from seizing the country at the moment of transition can find a much stronger national position than a force that uses emergency conditions for permanent rule.

Step Seven: Street Dissatisfaction Must Become Organized Political Power

The third way has no meaning without the people. But “the people” should not be defined only as presence in the street. The street can break the stalemate; but alone it cannot write a budget, run a central bank, design energy policy, manage foreign relations, or hold elections.

Therefore, a bridge must be created between social resistance and political organization. Unions, professional associations, student organizations, women’s organizations, teachers, workers, academics, entrepreneurs, professionals, artists, and various social groups must be able to organize. Alongside them, real political parties must form. If after breaking the stalemate, again only a few famous personalities decide about the people’s future, the third way has failed. Society must transform from a “dissatisfied population” into “organized citizens.”

Step Eight: Breaking the Economic Base of the Dual Power

If the previous economic structure remains intact, the previous political structure will sooner or later return. Networks that have become wealthy through rents, monopolies, rentier privatizations, non-transparent contracts, special access to currency and government resources, and family and political ties to decision-making centers will use their wealth to rebuild political power.

Therefore, the transition period must have immediate but limited economic reforms — not in the sense of general confiscation nor sudden change of the entire economic system. The priority must be transparency: Who owns what? To whom have major government contracts been awarded? How are “khosulati” (quasi-state) companies run? Where are conflicts of interest? How are public resources spent?

The goal must be to cut the cycle in which power produces wealth and wealth buys power again.

Step Nine: The Transition Period’s Foreign Policy Must Be “Active Non-Alignment”

The transition period will be one of the most vulnerable periods against foreign intervention. Every foreign power will try to shape the outcome of the transition in its favor.

Therefore, the third force must declare from the beginning that Iran will neither be transferred to the American camp nor become an appendage of Russia or China. Existing country contracts will be respected until legal review, and diplomatic relations will continue. But no foreign power has the right to decide about the composition of the transitional government or Iran’s future structure.

Iran must be able to have relations with China, Russia, Europe, Arab countries, India, Turkey, and if equal conditions are provided, with America. This is the policy that can be called active non-alignment and balancing: relations with all, dependence on none.

Step Ten: The People Must Decide About the Final Order

The transition council, armed forces, intellectuals, parties, and even leaders of the political movement have no right to predetermine what Iran’s final structure should be. They can propose and promote their proposals; but the final decision must pass through the people’s vote.

The exact form of this process can be debated: constituent assembly elections, referendum, parliamentary elections, or a combination. But the principle is clear: The transition period must not predetermine the final outcome; it must create the possibility of choosing the outcome.

A Simple Roadmap

If we want to summarize all this argument into an operational map, the logical order would be:

Minimum national understanding → Ensuring security and preventing collapse → Forming a non-monopolistic transitional structure → Preserving the state apparatus → Opening political space and freedom of organization → Transparency and containing rentier networks → Creating parties and an independent election body → Referral to the people’s vote → Full transfer of political power to elected institutions → Return of the armed forces to their professional defense mission.

The important point is that none of these stages should be considered the destination. The final destination is not the rule of a third force. The destination is creating a system that no longer fundamentally needs a “savior third force.”

The Third Way, an Anti-Coup in Its Political Sense

From this perspective, what is proposed is not a classic military coup. A coup usually means seizing power by a limited group and eliminating others. Whereas what is intended here must act opposite to this logic: breaking the monopoly to open the field of politics.

If we want to use the term “anti-coup” for it, its meaning must be clear: preventing an internal oligarchy, a foreign-dependent current, or a foreign power from using critical conditions to exclusively seize Iran’s future. But this “anti-coup” only has legitimacy if it immediately opens the way for politics. If a force in the name of preventing a coup takes power forever, it is no longer an anti-coup; it has itself become a coup.

The Success Criterion of the Third Way

Ultimately, there is a very simple criterion for measuring this project. Five years after the beginning of such a transition, one should be able to ask:

• Can people change their government more freely than before?
• Has the country become more independent?
• Has the risk of disintegration and civil war decreased?
• Can wealth buy politics less than before?
• Have the armed forces become more professional and less political?
• Can a government lose an election and hand over power without bloodshed?

If the answer to these questions is positive, the third way has succeeded. If only new individuals have replaced old ones, it has failed.

Therefore, the third way is ultimately neither a person, nor a general, nor a party, nor even a permanent coalition. The third way is a process: the process of Iran’s transition from the politics of elimination to the politics of competition; from dependence to independence; from oligarchy to accountability; and from unchangeable power to power that the people can change.

And perhaps its most important principle is this: The force that enters the field to break the stalemate must be ready from the first day to step aside from power after breaking the stalemate and leave judgment about the future to the people. Otherwise, we have not exited the stalemate; we have only changed the jailer.

That is why I define the “third way” not as an illusory path or a vague general concept, but as a specific map for transition — a map in which the actors, stages of movement, limits and restrictions of the military’s role and power, the time of their exit from the political scene, and the final destination of this transition are clear in advance. Therefore, I consider this way neither a military coup nor a prelude to the establishment of military rule, but a joint and “anti-coup” action whose main force is the people, with the country’s defense forces alongside them, relying on all existing political and social capacities and capabilities, helping to break the current stalemate and provide the ground for transferring power to popular and democratic mechanisms.

Reza Fani Yazdi — September 13, 2026 / Shahrivar 22, 1405