Iran on the Brink of Explosion

A Multidimensional Analysis of Overlapping Crises and the Decisive Role of Ayatollah Khamenei’s Leadership


Introduction: Why “the Brink of Explosion” Must Be Taken Seriously

When we speak of “Iran on the brink of explosion,” the first thing we must be careful about is not to oversimplify the issue. What Iran is facing today is not a single, isolated, one-dimensional crisis—nor merely a political crisis—but rather a constellation of simultaneous crises that overlap, reinforce one another, and continuously intensify. These crises operate across economic, social, political, psychological, emotional, and behavioral domains, as well as in the international and foreign-policy arena. They can only be understood through a multidimensional lens.

In this article, I aim to show that Iran’s current condition is the result of the entanglement of several core crisis domains:

  1. the economic and livelihood crisis,
  2. the crisis of political legitimacy,
  3. internal fractures and conflicts (both within the ruling system and between the state and society),
  4. the chronic crisis in foreign relations, and
  5. the role of Ayatollah Khamenei as both the system’s “axis of balance” and, at the same time, a potential trigger for an explosive rupture in the future.

It should be emphasized that the purpose of this discussion is not to offer a definitive prediction of future events. Rather, the goal is to explain the pressure mechanisms that have pushed the country toward a dangerous condition—one in which even a small stimulus or an external, uncontrollable factor can acquire an explosive function, with unpredictable consequences.

Let us therefore examine several of the current crises that have played a central role in producing this condition and whose rising intensity could ultimately lead to a real explosion. What are these crises, in order of their importance?


1) The Economic and Livelihood Crisis

The Erosion of Everyday Life and the Production of Accumulated Anger

The first and most tangible dimension of Iran’s explosive condition is the economic and livelihood crisis—a crisis that directly targets people’s daily lives. Chronic inflation, the collapse of purchasing power, job insecurity, the expansion of poverty, the state’s inability to provide minimum living necessities, and the vast and widening class gap are among the manifestations of the current economic crisis. Although we often resort to figures and statistics to illustrate its depth, we must remember that these are not merely lifeless economic indicators; they are forces that erode social trust and corrode the internal bonds of society.

The reality is that Iran’s economy is in a state of structural blockage:

  • it lacks the capacity for sustainable growth,
  • it cannot redistribute resources and wealth in a fair manner,
  • and it has no remaining capacity to absorb social discontent.

Under such conditions, economic pressure is no longer a temporary problem or an external variable. For large segments of society, it has become an existential experience—one that daily produces a sense of hopelessness about the future, social humiliation, and accumulated anger. This is why the economy becomes directly entangled with politics and social security: when the basic conditions of life are threatened, society’s capacity for patience and adaptation rapidly diminishes, bringing it ever closer to its explosive threshold.


2) The Crisis of Legitimacy and Public Trust

The Rupture Between State and Society

Yet the economic crisis alone does not explain why Iran’s situation can become explosive. What makes these pressures more dangerous is the crisis of political legitimacy. Iran’s political system faces a deep rupture between itself and society—a rupture that has not been repaired over the past decades, but has instead grown deeper and more entrenched with time.

Political legitimacy is not limited to elections or formal mechanisms; it fundamentally revolves around whether people perceive the ruling system as representing their interests, aspirations, and human dignity. In today’s Iran, for a large segment of society, the answer to this question is negative.

The collapse of trust in official institutions—from the leadership and legislative and executive bodies to the judiciary, state media, and electoral mechanisms—has stripped the political system of its moral and political capacity to persuade. In such a situation, the state increasingly relies on security and control instruments. Yet this reliance itself deepens the legitimacy crisis, creating a vicious cycle: the more control increases, the greater the distrust becomes; and the greater the distrust, the more the state feels compelled to rely on military and security institutions, further intensifying repression and control.


3) Internal Fractures and Conflicts

The third dimension of Iran’s explosive condition consists of internal fractures and conflicts, which must be examined at two distinct but interconnected levels: within the ruling system, and between the state and society.

3-1) Intra-Elite Conflicts and Power Competition

Within the structure of power, political rivalries, conflicting interests, and ideological and institutional divides exist. From the outside, these conflicts may appear as signs of political dynamism, but in practice they often lead to decision-making paralysis, policy instability, and managerial dysfunction.

The absence of a stable consensus within the ruling system over the past four decades—especially after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini—has weakened the regime’s ability to respond to crises, effectively delaying major decisions or rendering them contradictory and fragmented. The result is a diminished capacity for effective governance: the very capability any state needs to manage discontent, allocate resources, and maintain social cohesion.

3-2) The Gap Between the People and the State

The second level—more significant in terms of explosive potential—is the gap between the people and the state. This gap is the product of decades of accumulated economic, social, cultural, and political grievances that have either gone unanswered or have been met primarily through security measures, increasing restrictions, pressure, and repression.

People in Iran are not merely dissatisfied; they feel they possess no effective tools to change the status quo. This sense of voicelessness and ineffectiveness is one of the most dangerous elements of an explosive situation. A society that sees peaceful paths to reform as blocked becomes prone to sudden and explosive reactions. Here, the issue is not merely protest; it is that the state-society relationship approaches a point where any new crisis can emerge as a confrontational political crisis, rapidly escalating into widespread—and potentially violent—social unrest.


4) The Crisis of Foreign Relations

A Structural Driver of Crisis and an Amplifier of Internal Pressures

The fourth key component is Iran’s chronic crisis in foreign relations—a crisis as old as the Islamic Republic itself, casting a structural shadow over all internal crises.

Sustained confrontation with Western countries—especially the United States—and regionally, in particular with Israel, has imposed enormous economic, security, and political costs on Iran. Sanctions have not merely been economic pressure tools; they are part of a complex web of constraints that have disrupted Iran’s access to global markets, the international financial system, foreign investment, and even normal relations with neighboring countries.

This external pressure has not only weakened Iran’s economy but has also indirectly securitized the internal power structure, reducing the possibility of gradual reforms. Over four decades, the foreign-relations crisis has affected internal crises through two main channels:

  • Direct effects: sanctions, restrictions on exports and imports, banking disruptions, reduced investment, and declining economic growth.
  • Indirect effects: the creation of networks of financial corruption and smuggling to bypass sanctions, the concentration of wealth in the hands of a small group of regime-connected actors, the expansion of a security-dominated environment, the closure of dialogue pathways, intensified polarization, and the transfer of foreign-policy costs onto ordinary people’s livelihoods.

Thus, when we speak of Iran’s explosive condition, it must be understood as the product of all these intertwined crises—not in isolation or through a single-factor lens.


5) The Role of Ayatollah Khamenei

The “Central Pillar” and Balancer of Power in the Islamic Republic

Alongside all these factors, there is another crucial variable that must not be overlooked: the role of Ayatollah Khamenei over the past thirty-seven years in Iran’s society and politics.

Khamenei is, in effect, the central pillar of the Islamic Republic’s system. However, if this notion is misunderstood, it can lead to misinterpretation. Being the system’s central pillar does not mean that he is the sole decisive political authority governing through a simple personal dictatorship. The reality is more complex.

Khamenei’s role must be understood as one of balancing political power. He is a balancer of forces, and as long as he is alive, no other power center can fully emerge. He remains decisive in key domestic and foreign policy matters—but not alone, and not merely through reliance on his personal office.

More precisely, over the past four decades Khamenei has functioned as a nodal point: the junction where the formal legitimacy of all state networks and institutions, military and security mechanisms, and political coalitions converge. He has managed to construct a fragile yet enduring balance among military, security, clerical, political, and economic institutions—a balance that has prevented any single pole from seizing ultimate dominance. His skill, and the secret of his durability, lies in sustaining this fragile equilibrium, making him the axis of the system’s persistence and survival.


6) The Limits and Instruments of Leadership

Why Major Change Is Impossible Without a “Social Base”

Khamenei neither can nor wishes to reshape the country’s major trajectories solely through reliance on his office or a narrow inner circle. Any serious policy shift requires him to depend on the system’s popular base—a base that still encompasses more than twenty percent of Iranian society.

Analytically, this is critical: even if this social base has shrunk, it remains real, organized, and capable of mobilization at historical turning points. To advance his policies—especially those that provoke intra-elite tension or social reaction—Khamenei must secure the support of this constituency and use it as a source of power and legitimacy for both himself and the system.

For this reason, leadership in Iran must be understood not merely as a legal office, but as a mechanism of mobilization and a coordinating axis for political coalitions.


7) Leadership as a “Spark”

A Change of Course or Khamenei’s Death: Two Trigger Scenarios

If Iran is indeed on the brink of explosion, we must address the possible spark that could ignite the powder kegs described above. One of the most plausible sparks relates either to an unexpected intervention by Khamenei or to his absence. This spark can take two main forms:

7-1) A Leadership Decision to Change Domestic or Foreign Policy

First, Khamenei may at some point decide to alter the course of domestic or foreign policy. Such a decision could disrupt existing balances, raise social expectations, and trigger chain reactions within both the power structure and society. In a country long subjected to economic pressure, political blockage, and external tension, even a limited shift can produce unpredictable consequences.

7-2) Khamenei’s Death and a Leadership Vacuum

Second—and perhaps more sensitive—is Khamenei’s death and the resulting absence of his leadership. Succession in the Islamic Republic is not merely the replacement of an individual; it is the alteration of a balancing axis within a fragile system. Removing this axis could intensify intra-elite conflicts, expose institutional fractures, and plunge society into a period of uncertainty and instability, bringing it closer to an explosive point.

This is precisely the moment anticipated both by Khamenei’s domestic political opponents and by Iran’s external adversaries—particularly the United States and Israel—who may believe that his removal creates an opportunity to push the system toward explosion and collapse. Whether this assumption is correct or not is a separate debate. What matters is that the very existence of such calculations highlights Khamenei’s central role in maintaining the system’s structural stability.


8) External Threats and the Risk of War

A Crisis Multiplier and Accelerator of Explosion

Another critical factor contributing to Iran’s explosive condition is the external threat and risk of war—especially from the United States and Israel. Contrary to simplistic interpretations, this factor is neither purely external nor separate from internal crises; it is a variable capable of simultaneously deepening, accelerating, and interlinking all the crises discussed above.

If the United States or Israel—or a combination of both—were to launch a military attack on Iran and target critical infrastructure, the key question would not only be the scale of military or economic damage, but the uncontrollable chain reactions such an attack could unleash across other domains.

Even a limited—or so-called “precise” or surgical—strike would likely target Iran’s economic, energy, transportation, communications, and military-security infrastructure. Given Iran’s existing structural economic blockage, resource exhaustion, and sanctions pressure, such a blow could push the economy into an unabsorbable shock phase.

The consequences, however, would not be merely economic:

  • First: a severe intensification of the livelihood crisis, manifested through inflation, shortages, supply-chain disruptions, currency collapse, and a sharp decline in living standards.
  • Second: heightened securitization of domestic space, giving the state justification to further restrict political and social life—temporarily stabilizing control, but deepening legitimacy erosion over time.
  • Third: disruption of internal power balances, intensifying elite rivalries and weakening decision-making coherence, where the cost of political errors becomes far higher than in non-war conditions.
  • Fourth: activation of collapse scenarios in external strategic calculations, where military pressure is seen as a tool to push internal crises toward explosion.

In this framework, external threat functions not as a peripheral factor, but as an accelerator of all internal crises—deepening the economic crisis, intensifying the legitimacy crisis, radicalizing social fractures, and rendering governance more fragile. War, or even its prolonged shadow, could thus serve as the very spark that—combined with livelihood pressures and leadership uncertainties—drives Iran toward uncontrolled collapse.


9) The Explosive Condition and Its Meaning for Iran’s Future

In conclusion, when we speak of “Iran on the brink of explosion,” we are not predicting a specific moment or declaring the inevitability of regime collapse. Rather, we are describing a structural condition in which multiple crises operate simultaneously and interactively, sharply reducing the capacity for political control and management.

In this condition, economic pressure approaches the limits of social tolerance; the legitimacy crisis erodes state-society bonds; internal fractures complicate decision-making; foreign-relations crises internalize their costs; leadership functions simultaneously as a stabilizer and a potential rupture point; and external threats can amplify all pressures non-linearly.

What makes the situation explosive is not any single crisis, but their overlap and simultaneity. Under such circumstances, a relatively limited trigger—economic, political, security-related, or external—can act as a spark without the trajectory of events being predictable or controllable.

Understanding Iran’s future therefore requires avoiding single-cause and simplistic analyses. Explosion, collapse, and democratic transition are not synonymous and should not be mechanically conflated.

  • Explosion refers to the sudden release of accumulated pressures; it does not necessarily produce lasting change.
  • Collapse denotes the disintegration of core governance structures and often leads to instability, violence, and power vacuums rather than improvement.
  • Democratic transition is a conscious, gradual political process requiring organized social forces, institutional development, dialogue, and a minimum level of stability.

A common error in Persian-language media is to mechanically link these three concepts. In reality, explosion can occur without collapse, collapse can persist without democracy, and democratic transition usually emerges from crisis management—not from the escalation of explosive conditions.

What matters now is grasping the logic of this dangerous condition: a condition produced above all by the accumulation of crises and the erosion of capacities to resolve them.


Reza Fani Yazdi
February 2, 2026

This article is the text of my talk at the Iranian Cultural Enthusiasts Association in Washington, D.C., delivered on February 2, 2026, and published for the benefit of other interested readers.