Iran’s Resistance Today; the Endurance of a Powerful Iran Tomorrow
In strategic assessments of the current situation in the Middle East, one of the most important issues has always been the possibility of a direct and large-scale confrontation between the United States and Iran. Many political analysts—along with Iranian officials—have long warned that any military action against Iran would be unlikely to remain confined to a short and limited operation. Even if Iran is assumed to lack the capacity to confront the United States directly in a conventional, classical war, experience has shown that it possesses tools capable of dramatically increasing the cost of war for the United States, Israel, and even the entire region.
What we see today on the battlefield is the result of the very warning that Ayatollah Khamenei referred to before his death in his final speech: that if Iran were attacked, the conflict would become a regional war. The war currently underway is based precisely on this logic—a war whose beginning may have been imagined as simple, but whose control and conclusion are far more difficult than its planners anticipated. It appears that they did not take Khamenei’s warnings very seriously.
The War We See Today Is the “Third Phase” of a Project
What we are witnessing these days—the war that has now been underway for several days—is in fact the third phase of a conflict that began in June of last year.
The first phase was the twelve-day attack on Iran. The primary goal of that attack was regime change in Iran. The leaders of Israel and the United States believed that if they targeted Iran’s political leadership in the early days of the conflict, the government would collapse, the public would pour into the streets, and people would take matters into their own hands. They assumed that the emerging alternative political structure, out of fear and chaos, would be forced to accept all the demands of the United States and Israel.
But that did not happen. The timely response and resistance of the Islamic Republic, the powerful presence of the country’s leadership, and the lack of public support for a foreign war caused this plan to fail. The first phase of this project—the project of overthrowing the system—ended in complete failure, with a ceasefire announced and accepted by all three sides.
The second phase unfolded in the form of internal unrest. A combination of pressures and provocations—including the activities of infiltrating forces and economic and sanctions policies—created conditions in which a segment of society, under pressure, took to the streets. As American and Israeli political figures repeatedly signaled in various ways that “help is on the way,” they hoped this internal wave would reach a point where it could shatter the political order. But this phase, too, was suppressed at its peak, and once again the project of regime overthrow failed and came to an end.
Now the third phase has begun: a phase in which the United States and Israel have once again entered the arena with greater intensity. This time they calculated that if the “political leadership” were eliminated, the Islamic Republic would collapse permanently. This illusion—that killing Iran’s leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, would cause the system to disintegrate—was not limited to the minds of American and Israeli officials; many Iranian opponents of the government believed the same.
Why Did They Attack in the Middle of Negotiations?
The key to understanding the decision by the United States and Israel lies in what they observed during the negotiations. During the talks, they realized that Iranian officials had become willing to consider accepting conditions that had previously been regarded as “red lines”: a complete halt to uranium enrichment, the transfer of highly enriched material, and acceptance of models such as consortium arrangements or long-term restrictions.
For the American side, these concessions suggested that fear of war had become serious within the highest levels of power in Iran, and that Trump’s threats and bluffs had had an effect. Therefore, despite public statements that the negotiations were progressing well—and even though technical teams were expected to begin implementing agreements—suddenly the decision to attack was made.
Their logic was this: if Iran, under the pressure of fear, had already abandoned previous red lines, then greater military pressure—or even a direct attack—could force the rest of their demands to be accepted. In the best-case scenario, eliminating the country’s political leader would compel the remaining structure of the regime to surrender completely.
However, events on the battlefield unfolded differently from these calculations, and this project once again clearly failed.
The Elimination of Khamenei Did Not Bring “Collapse”; It Made the War More Regional
Contrary to the expectations of the United States, Israel, and many opponents of the Islamic Republic, the system did not collapse after the death of Ayatollah Khamenei. On the contrary, the wartime atmosphere and the shock caused by this event helped generate a form of social unity within Iran and strengthened the spirit of resistance.
Khamenei, with his long history of political struggle and advanced age, was not someone unaware of the possibility of death. Such a death, in the eyes of a significant portion of the regime’s social base, could be transformed into symbolic capital—and that is precisely what happened. The reactions were not limited to Iran; in many Islamic countries waves of protest and unrest emerged, and in some places attacks were even organized against American and Israeli interests or against U.S. bases.
As a result, the project based on the assumption that “removing Khamenei means the end of the regime” failed. The power structure moved toward reorganization and replacement, while the scope of the war expanded further toward regionalization—exactly what Khamenei had warned during his lifetime: that an attack on Iran could turn into a regional war. Now we see that even in his absence, his strategic logic continues in practice; the war has become regional, and the government has remained.
This Is Where Strategic Analyses of “War with Iran” Become Reality
From a strategic perspective, the reason war with Iran cannot easily be controlled is precisely this: even without classical military superiority, Iran possesses leverage that can quickly transform a limited operation into a regional—or even global—crisis.
A) Targeting U.S. Bases in the Region
The United States has dozens of military bases and installations across the Middle East. Any strike against these bases would rapidly expand the scope of the war and involve the host countries, turning the conflict from merely a war between Iran and Israel or Iran and the United States into a broader regional crisis.
B) Missile and Drone Capabilities and the Vulnerability of Defense Systems
Iran possesses a substantial arsenal of ballistic missiles and combat drones. Even with advanced defense systems, no missile defense can provide complete protection against sustained, high-volume attacks. In a real war, “volume,” “repetition,” and the “range of targets” can wear down and saturate defense systems. As a result, the cost of war—for the parties involved and for regional states—rises exponentially.
C) The Strait of Hormuz and the Energy Shock
Iran occupies a sensitive geopolitical position near the Strait of Hormuz. Any serious disruption in this passage could shock the global energy market and trigger an economic crisis. This means that even if the United States and Israel attempt to keep the war localized, global economic pressures and international reactions could escalate the conflict beyond their control.
D) The Logic of Chain Reactions in the Middle East
The Middle East is a complex network of alliances, rivalries, proxy groups, security commitments, and religious and social sensitivities. Once an attack and counterattack begin, other actors can quickly be drawn in. Wars often begin easily, but once they start, public pressure, the need to respond, and fear of appearing weak push leaders toward escalation.
What Can the United States and Israel Do Now?
This is precisely the central dilemma: they did not anticipate such a situation and lack a clear and reliable plan for exiting the crisis. The project of collapsing the Islamic Republic after Khamenei’s death has failed, and the Iranian government remains in place. Inside the country, contrary to their expectations, a wave of public protest aimed at overthrowing the system did not emerge. Even if small demonstrations occurred, the announcement of Khamenei’s death hardened the overall atmosphere and significantly raised the cost of street opposition.
At the same time, Khamenei’s absence—within the internal logic of the system—may give greater freedom of action to hardline factions and push politics toward further radicalization:
- External war and the threat of destruction strengthen the cohesion of radical currents.
- Obstacles such as the “fatwa prohibiting nuclear weapons” may no longer play the same restraining role as before, and decisions may move toward harsher options.
- Security forces and hardline groups may act with greater latitude against internal opponents.
Thus, contrary to Washington and Tel Aviv’s initial expectations, the situation is not improving; it may become more difficult and unpredictable.
Gulf Countries: The Weak Point of the Crisis
A significant part of the crisis concerns the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf. These states have already been exposed to missile strikes, and many of them lack the capacity to endure or sustain such attacks—not only militarily, but also in terms of internal stability.
Bahrain, due to its history of internal unrest, is among the most fragile. Not long ago, a popular uprising there was suppressed with the intervention of thousands of Saudi troops. Today many people in Bahrain—whose territory historically once belonged to Iran—are deeply dissatisfied with their local government. If Iranian strikes intensify, the country could face a serious security crisis and potentially lose control.
Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, with their particular demographic composition—where roughly 90 percent of the population consists of migrant workers—would face major challenges under conditions of prolonged instability.
Kuwait is not in a much stronger position. About 70 percent of its population of roughly 4.5 million consists of migrant workers from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Philippines, making the country’s internal cohesion highly fragile in the face of an external war.
Although Saudi Arabia and Turkey have greater geopolitical weight:
- Turkey, at least for now, is not in a position to enter a war against Iran.
- Saudi Arabia, if it joins Israel in a war against Iran, would face serious legitimacy costs in the Muslim world and internal pressure—risks that would be extremely heavy for Mohammed bin Salman.
Therefore, the United States cannot easily use regional countries as military leverage. If they do enter the conflict, they may end up among its principal losers. Most importantly, after witnessing the suffering of the people of Gaza and the killing of tens of thousands by Israel, public opinion in these countries is unlikely to accept that their governments cooperate with Israel and the United States in attacking a Muslim country like Iran—especially a country seen as itself a victim of Israeli aggression.
The Central Issue: Iran’s Resistance
Ultimately, if Iran manages to endure this war and preserve its existence, the outcome could represent a strategic defeat for the United States and Israel. It may even lead to renewed discussions about the withdrawal or limitation of American military bases in the region.
In such a scenario, Iran—even if heavily damaged—could rely on support from Russia and China to begin reconstruction and consolidate its regional position.
However, if resistance collapses in the coming weeks, or if parts of the leadership move toward surrender and ceasefire, the project of systemic collapse will continue, and sustained pressure could gradually exhaust and immobilize Iran.
At present, the most important question is the extent of the Iranian people’s determination and will to resist.
Iran, in any case, will remain. The survival of Iran itself would represent the failure of the Israeli and American project. The end of this war could ultimately consolidate Iran’s political position as one of the key countries of the region—a country that, if it survives this war, may once again establish itself permanently as one of the region’s leading powers.
The primary objective of the United States and Israel in launching another war against Iran has already failed. The question now is how the war will be managed, how long it will last, and—most importantly—how much capacity and determination Iran can maintain both on the battlefield and within its society. This is the point that will determine the fate of this stage of the conflict with the United States and Israel—and at the same time determine what real options Washington and Tel Aviv will have for exiting the crisis.
Iran’s resistance today; the endurance of a powerful Iran tomorrow.
Reza Fani Yazdi
March 3, 2026 (13 Esfand 1404)