Part One: Has the War Entered a New Phase?
The war that was initially known as a direct confrontation between Iran and Israel is today displaying signs of entering an entirely different phase. While in the opening weeks the primary focus was on direct Israeli attacks and Iranian responses, the scope of the conflict has now expanded in such a way that new actors are gradually entering the arena—actors whose presence could transform the nature of the war from a bilateral clash into an all-encompassing crisis across the Middle East.
Developments in Iraq, Saudi Arabia’s direct entry into military operations against Iran-aligned forces, Ukraine’s role in certain regional events, and the potential involvement of other actors such as Pakistan are all signals that prompt a critical question: Is what we are witnessing today merely the continuation of the Iran-Israel war, or is it the beginning of a new phase of geopolitical realignments in the region?
A definitive answer to this question is not yet possible, but the sequence of events in recent weeks demonstrates that the trend of developments is moving beyond conventional warfare and must be analyzed collectively.
Iraq: The Next Link in the Chain of Pressure
One of the most significant recent developments was the U.S. strikes on Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF / Hashd al-Shaabi) positions in Iraq. The significance of these attacks is not limited to their military dimension; their political and regional consequences may prove far more decisive.
In response to these operations, Donald Trump declared that officials from several Arab nations, including Iraqi authorities, were aware of these strikes and even welcomed them. If this assessment is accurate, one can infer that a section of regional Arab governments, at least on a limited level, has aligned with the United States—and likely Israel—in weakening forces close to the Islamic Republic of Iran.
This issue gains even greater significance when viewed along the trajectory of regional developments over the past few years.
For years, Syria was considered the Islamic Republic of Iran’s most crucial regional ally. Although the Syrian civil war did not initially lead to the immediate fall of the Damascus government, it exacted heavy costs on this axis and ultimately resulted in the complete collapse of the Syrian regime. Now, after Syria, it appears to be Iraq’s turn—a country that over the past two decades became one of the primary pillars of Iranian regional influence.
If military and political pressures on Iraq persist, the objective will not merely be containing Iranian influence, but rather the potential destabilization of Iraq’s entire political structure—a scenario sharing similarities with the experiences of Lebanon and Syria. Under such circumstances, another core pillar of what is termed the “Axis of Resistance” could face a profound crisis.
Saudi Arabia’s Direct Entry: Crossing a Red Line
Another development that cannot be easily overlooked is Saudi Arabia’s direct entry into military operations against a segment of Iran-aligned forces in Iraq.
In recent attacks, Hashd al-Shaabi bases were targeted in joint operations—forces that constitute part of Iraq’s official defense apparatus. Saudi Arabia’s formal involvement in such operations, irrespective of its military scale, carries a major political message.
Saudi Arabia had previously played roles in confronting allies of the Islamic Republic—ranging from the war in Yemen to targeting aircraft carrying Yemeni and Iranian officials, bombing Yemeni airports, and a series of past security and military actions, culminating in two weeks ago when airport shelling prevented an Iranian aircraft from landing. However, entering directly into operations against Iraqi forces marks a distinct phase in this trend.
This raises the question: Has Riyadh effectively entered into a direct confrontation with the axis of Iran’s allies? If the answer is affirmative, the likelihood of other Persian Gulf Arab states joining is no longer far-fetched.
Such a development could fundamentally alter the geography of the war; in that scenario, the conflict would no longer be strictly between Iran and Israel, but rather a large portion of regional countries would become embroiled in one way or another.
Ukraine: An Actor That Should Not Be Ignored
Another notable development is Ukraine’s role in the region’s new equations.
The attack on an Iranian cargo ship in the Caspian Sea, while insufficient on its own to draw definitive conclusions, coincided with Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit to the United States and his meetings with Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu—raising questions that cannot be casually dismissed.
Was this action part of a coordinated plan? Was its objective merely to send a warning message to Iran? Or was it an independent move to secure greater Western support?
While definitive answers remain unclear, the reality is that Ukraine had already entered the security dynamics of the Persian Gulf in various forms.
The sale of anti-drone systems to the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, dispatching military experts to train these countries’ forces, and participating in the setup of air defense networks indicate that Ukraine’s presence in the region is not isolated to a single recent event.
Consequently, the hypothesis arises that Kyiv’s future role might extend beyond what has been previously assumed.
Is the Goal to Expand the Battlefield?
If we assemble these developments together, a hypothesis emerges that warrants closer examination.
It is possible that the objective of certain actors is the gradual expansion of the battlefield, forcing Iran to divide its military capabilities across multiple fronts. In such a state, the primary focus would be lifted off Israel, and a major portion of Iran’s military capacity would be consumed in confronting numerous regional actors.
In this scenario, Saudi Arabia’s entry, Ukraine’s involvement, the potential presence of Pakistan, and even the possible role of countries like the Republic of Azerbaijan could all be components of a larger trend—a trend that, if realized, would completely reshape the geopolitical map of the war.
It must be emphasized, however, that this framework remains an analytical hypothesis regarding the potential trajectory of events, not a report of proven facts. Whether this scenario materializes depends on the political and military decisions of various players and the developments that unfold in the coming days and weeks.
Part Two: Shifting the Battlefield; How Israel Exited the Center of the War
In Part One, I highlighted indicators suggesting the war may be entering a new phase—one in which Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine, and potentially Pakistan and other actors in the future, are gradually drawn into the confrontation. Connecting these dots forms a hypothesis that could serve as a key to understanding recent events: Has Israel managed to shift the main theater of war?
This question becomes especially significant when we recall Israel’s conditions at the onset of this crisis.
Israel in an Unprecedented Position
In the early days of the war, Israel faced one of the most challenging security environments in its history. For the first time in decades, large portions of territory under Israeli control were subject to sustained missile and drone strikes. Critical components of its air defense systems operated around the clock, and military, economic, and psychological pressure on Israeli society mounted rapidly.
Alongside this military strain, regional public opinion was mobilized against Israel more than ever before. Across many Arab and Islamic nations, despite political differences between governments, public sentiment supported Iran against Israeli attacks, viewing the war as a confrontation with a state that endangered the entire region’s security.
The continuation of such a situation threatened to draw Israel into a war of attrition—a conflict whose costs would gradually exceed the country’s capacity.
If this assessment is correct, it is logical that Israeli leaders sought a way to alter the rules of the game.
Shifting the Vector of Hostility
One of the most crucial hypotheses regarding recent developments is that Israel has attempted to shift the primary vector of hostility.
As long as the war remained a direct confrontation between Iran and Israel, Tel Aviv was the primary epicenter of strikes. The bulk of Iran’s missile, drone, and intelligence capabilities were focused squarely on that axis.
However, if the battlefield expands to Iraq, Syria, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and other regional states, the equation changes completely.
Under these conditions, Iran no longer faces Israel alone; it is forced to simultaneously manage strikes against U.S. bases, developments in Iraq, Persian Gulf maritime security, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and perhaps other fronts in the future.
The result of such a shift is that Israel ceases to be the sole primary target of Iranian military operations.
Exiting the Center of Fire
If this scenario has been realized, one of Israel’s major achievements is its gradual exit from the center of direct conflict.
In this setup, a significant portion of Iran’s missile and drone capacity—rather than concentrating on targets inside Israel—is expended in responding to attacks or threats emanating from other regional actors.
U.S. military bases, oil infrastructure, energy hubs, ports, desalination plants, and infrastructure across various regional countries gradually become part of the active theater.
The wider the geography of the war spreads, the more dispersed Iran’s military focus inevitably becomes.
This is precisely the shift that can fundamentally alter the initial equations of the war.
A War of Attrition Without Direct Presence
A defining feature of modern warfare is the finite nature of military resources. No country possesses unlimited stocks of missiles, drones, defense interceptors, or advanced hardware. Even major powers face resource depletion in prolonged conflicts.
If Iran is forced to operate simultaneously across multiple fronts, it will naturally consume a large share of its military capacity in areas that may not have been top priorities at the war’s outset.
Conversely, without being directly present on all these fronts, Israel observes the gradual consumption of Iran’s military capacity.
In such circumstances, Tel Aviv not only endures less direct pressure, but can also step into subsequent phases of the conflict at an opportune moment using conserved resources.
Shifting the Psychology of the War
Perhaps even more vital than the geographical relocation of the war is the shift in its psychological landscape.
At the onset of the crisis, many populations across the region set aside political differences, viewing the war as a confrontation between Iran and Israel.
However, if the conflict spills into Arab states, this perception gradually shifts.
In such an environment, a major segment of Arab public opinion will no longer view Israel as the primary source of their daily insecurity; instead, they may perceive the reciprocal strikes between Iran and regional states as the core driver of the crisis.
Consequently, the rift that existed for decades between Israel and the Arab world could gradually be replaced by a rift between Iran and its Arab neighbors.
Such a shift, if fully realized, would mark one of Israel’s greatest political achievements—as a long-standing objective of Tel Aviv has been transitioning from the “common threat of the Arab world” to a “security partner of Arab nations.”
Information Warfare and Operations of Deception
Alongside military battles, the pivotal role of information warfare must not be overlooked. In many contemporary crises, psychological and information operations are no less critical than physical maneuvers.
If guided intelligence, targeted security evaluations, and deliberate warnings—crafted directly or indirectly by Israeli operatives—successfully influence Iranian decision-makers and induce a sense of mutual threat between Iran and Arab nations, Tehran’s political and military decisions will move precisely along that pre-scripted path.
In such a climate, every new strike, retaliatory action, or security misunderstanding can rapidly expand the scope of the war in a direction that ultimately benefits only Israel.
As a result, even if regional parties did not initially seek such an outcome, the region—driven by the provocations of Israeli intelligence services and their sway over Iranian authorities’ calculations—is unwittingly pushed toward an all-out war.
Is This the “Geopolitical Chessboard”?
Assembling all these developments paints a picture that can be described as a complex geopolitical chessboard.
In this scenario, the primary goal is not merely the military defeat of Iran, but the complete redesign of the region’s political and security architecture. In this new arrangement, Israel steps back from the center of direct conflict, leaves Muslim nations increasingly embroiled against one another, and depletes the military and economic capacity of regional powers in a long, attritional war.
It must be reiterated that this analytical model is a hypothesis regarding the potential horizon of events, not an established fact. The realization of this scenario ultimately depends on how all regional and international actors play their hands, alongside the political-military shifts in the weeks and months ahead.
Part Three: Consequences of the New Strategy; From Washington to Islamabad
If the hypothesis presented in the previous two sections holds true, one must accept that the goal of this strategy is not merely changing the geography of the war, but transforming the political, security, and psychological equations of the crisis. In such a scenario, the war is no longer waged solely on the physical battlefield; it proceeds simultaneously across diplomacy, public opinion, media, and domestic politics within the involved nations. One of the most critical arenas in this struggle is the United States—where the fate of many military decisions is ultimately tied to internal political dynamics.
Changing the War Narrative in the United States
In recent years, particularly following the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, a significant segment of American society has grown skeptical of engaging in new Middle Eastern conflicts. This trend exists not only among Democrats, but also within a major faction of Republicans, particularly the “America First” movement.
Figures such as Tucker Carlson and numerous politicians aligned with this current have repeatedly warned that the U.S. should not be dragged into another war that they believe primarily serves Israeli interests. From this vantage point, if the war is framed strictly as “defending Israel,” domestic opposition will surge, placing a heavy political cost on any administration in Washington.
However, if the same war is presented through a different narrative, the conditions shift.
When U.S. bases in Iraq, Jordan, or the Persian Gulf are targeted, or when the energy infrastructure of Washington’s regional allies is damaged, the war narrative shifts from “defending Israel” to “defending U.S. forces, Washington’s allies, and global energy security.”
This narrative shift can soften opposition from large anti-war factions and provide the political ground required for broader U.S. intervention. In other words, if the theater of war shifts from Israel to the entire region, the political legitimacy of a U.S. presence increases domestically.
How Mediators Become Parties to the War
Another major consequence of expanding the war’s geography is the erosion of roles played by countries that previously served as mediators or regional balancers.
In recent years, nations like Qatar, Oman, and to some extent Kuwait, have repeatedly acted as intermediaries between Iran and the West, or between Iran and Arab states. Even Saudi Arabia, following its China-brokered agreement with Iran, attempted to manage its relations with Tehran within a controlled framework.
Yet, when war spills onto their soil or targets their vital infrastructure, the role of mediator naturally gives way to that of an active participant.
A country whose refineries, ports, airports, or desalination plants are struck can no longer maintain its former neutrality. Under such conditions, national security imperatives override diplomatic mediation.
If this trend continues, Iran will gradually face a coalition of nations—each driven by security or political reasons—aligned against it. While the initial blueprint of this coalition may have been drawn in Tel Aviv, its primary costs would be borne by other regional states and the United States.
Pakistan: The Link That Could Shift the Balance
Among all potential players, perhaps no country possesses greater power to influence the future of this crisis than Pakistan.
Pakistan is the sole nuclear-armed Muslim nation, possessing a large and capable military. Furthermore, Islamabad has maintained extensive defense and security cooperation with Saudi Arabia over many years, with both nations sharing deep military ties.
Should the crisis expand to a point where Saudi Arabia feels the need for broader military cooperation to safeguard its security, the possibility of Pakistan entering the equation—directly or indirectly—becomes tangible.
The mere introduction of this possibility holds immense weight; Pakistan’s entry would not simply mean adding another actor, but could alter the overall balance of power in the region.
In that event, Iran would be compelled to redirect a portion of its military, intelligence, and political focus toward its eastern borders and South Asian developments—reducing its capacity to concentrate on other fronts.
Will Other Actors Enter?
Alongside Pakistan, other countries are occasionally cited in analytical discussions, including the Republic of Azerbaijan and certain other regional states.
While there are currently no definitive signs that these countries have decided to enter the war directly, if the expansion of the crisis persists, the likelihood of increased regional participation cannot be entirely ruled out.
Every new actor represents a new front, and every new front absorbs a portion of Iran’s military, economic, and diplomatic capacity.
In such a landscape, even if none of these countries plays a decisive role individually, their cumulative effect could exert a substantial impact on the course of the war.
The Vision of “Scorched Earth” in the Islamic World
Bringing all these developments together reveals a picture that may represent Israel’s most significant potential achievement in this crisis.
At the onset of the war, Israel stood at the center of the confrontation and bore the primary costs. However, if the conflict gradually transitions into a confrontation between Iran, the United States, and a collective of regional Muslim nations, the environment undergoes a complete transformation.
In this scenario, Islamic nations would expend the bulk of their financial, military, and economic resources confronting one another. Vital regional infrastructure would be damaged, economic investment would stall, political instability would spread, and new rifts would deepen among Muslim populations.
Should this trend persist, rather than being locked in a war of attrition itself, Israel could observe the gradual attrition of its regional rivals—a scenario that aligns with the strategy long referred to as creating a “scorched earth” in Israel’s periphery.
Conclusion
The sequence of developments unfolding across Iraq, the Persian Gulf, and other regional points raises the question of whether the war has entered a stage where its primary goal is no longer a direct confrontation between Iran and Israel, but rather the transformation of the entire Middle Eastern security architecture.
Strikes in Iraq, Saudi Arabia’s direct entry, Ukraine’s involvement, the potential participation of Pakistan, and the gradual realignment of regional states could all be components of a broader trajectory—one that, if sustained, will reshape not only the outcome of the war, but the future security order of the Middle East.
Nevertheless, one must distinguish between analytical frameworks and empirical facts. Much of what has been outlined here relies on synthesizing events into an analytical model to comprehend them. Whether this scenario materializes depends on the political and military choices of various actors, public responses, and the flow of events in the coming weeks and months.
Yet, even if only a fraction of these trends comes to fruition, one reality cannot be ignored: the Middle East stands on the precipice of a phase where the boundary between bilateral wars and an all-out regional confrontation has become narrower and more fragile than ever before.
Perhaps one of the few remaining ways to prevent the spread of conflict among Muslim nations and redirect attention back to the root cause of the crisis is for Iranian authorities to focus their full will directly on targeting Israel.
Such a strategy would not only align regional public opinion with Iran, but also compel the Israeli lobby in the United States to face the severe costs of the war, forcing Washington to accept and impose a ceasefire—an outcome that could ultimately pave the way for a more durable peace.
On the other hand, the simultaneous weakening of Iran and other Islamic powers will not eliminate the risk of future wars; instead, it leaves the entire region vulnerable before an unrivaled and untouchable Israel—a power that would subsequently go after regional nations one by one, ensuring that the cycle of conflicts in this region will not easily end.
Reza Fani Yazdi
August 1, 2026